The US-Israeli war on Iran is now in well into its third week and, despite deployment of the overwhelming military superiority of the US and Israel, there seems to be no end in sight. Israel is continuing its bloodthirsty “decapitation” campaign against the top political, civilian and military leadership. It has murdered the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the internationally respected security chief and regime interlocutor Ali Larijani and numerous leaders of the regular army, the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Internal Security Basij force. US President Donald Trump says the war is already won, and that the US campaign has been so successful that “there are no targets left.” Yet, missiles and air strikes by both sides continue relentlessly, now even embroiling US allies in the Gulf States and the broader West Asian region. Against the fond hopes of an uprising to overthrow the regime, explicitly egged on by both Trump and Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu, the Iranian regime has neither surrendered nor collapsed. With Iran having effectively choked the narrow Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of global oil and gas passes besides other goods, the impact of the war is being felt all over the world.

It appears that the war is at a strategic stand-off, with indications of a prolonged conflict with considerable uncertainty about outcomes. What military strategies and weapons have been deployed by both sides to bring about this current position, and what can be said about the future course of hostilities? If “war is politics by other means,” as von Clausewitz famously said, what political goals are being pursued by US-Israel and Iran through the military means deployed?  

Iran’s missile war

A major factor in Iran’s demonstrated ability during this war to both inflict pain on the US and Israel, and also prolong the war to its advantage, has been its use of missiles and drones. We will discuss missiles first.

Missiles have long been Iran’s weapon of choice. Iran is fully aware that it cannot match US and Israeli strike power of modern fighter aircraft, nor can it defend itself well against them. Iran’s air force relies on old outdated aircraft, and its air defence radars and systems too are ineffective. So over the years Iran has developed a wide variety of both ballistic and cruise missiles, with short ranges of 300-700 km and medium ranges of 1200-2000 km with variations in between. It has also built a vast and efficient industrial base for production of these missiles, as well as a system of widely distributed, hardened deep underground missile stocking and firing sites. During the current war, Iran has deployed its missiles strategically.

During the 12-day war in June 2025 when the US and Israel bombarded Iran’s underground nuclear facilities, Iran retaliated by firing numerous salvos of medium-range missiles at Israel, causing significant but not severe damage, limited by Israeli and US air defences, as well as accuracy and other problems with its own missile systems. Lessons seem to have since been learned.

Iran knew well that Israel and the US would likely attack again and built a large stockpile, modified its tactics and adopted measures to improve accuracy of its missile. The brutal assault by Israel and the US on 28 February and the cold-blooded assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei and other senior leaders convinced Iran that it  was now in a fight for its very survival.

With a large stockpile available, Iran’s initial missile salvos saw some missiles getting through Israel’s missile defence shield, raised battle costs and also depleted Israel’s stocks of expensive and hard-to-replace air defence missiles. Israel uses a three-tier missile defence system with the US-made Arrow system for high-altitude interception, the Israeli David’s Sling mid-altitude system and the Israeli Iron Dome system for low altitudes. Obviously, the aim is to intercept at high altitudes since less time is available at lower altitudes, where more missiles may get through. Problem is that each Arrow-3 missile costs over $30 million compared to about $5-8 million for Iran’s medium-range missiles, with experts estimating that Israel spends about 10 times as much on missile defence as Iran does on missile attacks. Iran has also recently started mounting cluster munitions on its missile warheads, with each missile releasing dozens of small bomblets, making interception even more difficult.

The US has substantial stocks but its production rates are inadequate for war-time resupply. The US-made top-of-the-line THAAD (theatre air defence) systems, stationed on US aircraft carriers and also in Israel, Saudi, Qatar, Jordan and UAE cost about $8 billion but, more importantly, take about 8 years to produce, which is why the US was compelled to move its THAAD batteries from South Korea to West Asia over-ruling the former’s protests.   

As per reliable reportage, Israel is said to have told the US it is running dangerously low on missile defence munitions due to the relentless Iranian missile barrage, and has appealed to the US for urgent replenishments.  

US intelligence and some observers are also reporting a recent 90% drop in Iranian missile and drone launches, but it is unclear if this is because Iran is tactically holding back or waiting to build up stocks.

Another factor not often taken into account is that Iran seems to have noticeably improved accuracy of its missile and drone strikes, possibly using the Chinese BeiDou satellite positioning system which is far more accurate than the commercial US GPS service that Iran was using earlier and which can be easily jammed by the US. There are also unconfirmed reports that Iran may be using the Russian GLONASS or even the commercially available Iridium satellite phone system.

Iran’s short-range missiles have also been used effectively against US bases and facilities in Gulf States and other West Asian countries, imposing high costs, damaging their image as safe investment and tourism havens, and challenging the reliability and value of the US security umbrella. Attacks on these regional US allies have been a major weapon in Iran’s armory to dent the US-Israeli war machine and put pressure on them to pull back and bring hostilities to a close.

Of course, the US and Israel are doing their utmost to destroy Iranian missile launch and production sites. But these are scattered all over this vast country, and are believed to be deep underground in hardened facilities.

Drone warfare

The calculus of asymmetric warfare applies even more to drones, which iran has used extensively against the US and Israel for the first time.

Iran has gained enormous experience in designing and building its now famous Shahed and other kamikaze or one-way drones being mass produced and operated by Russia in the Ukraine theatre, where drones are having a devastating impact on armour and soldiers on both sides. Their extensive use is aided by their low cost of around $20,000 or less when mass produced, range of upto 1200-1500 km, low altitude operations making radar detection difficult, and high maneuverability. Smaller quadcopter-type drones costing around $500, operated over short ranges by individual soldiers, are versions of drones available commercially at hobby stores and are being assembled at home by volunteers in Ukraine.

Iran has deployed these drones across the region inflicting considerable damage on US bases and other facilities. The huge cost of intercepting these drones using air defence missiles costing $4-5 million cannot be overstated.

Ukraine too has gained valuable experience in developing counter-tactics and inexpensive attack drones to bring down enemy drones, but these are not yet available in the Iran theatre. The US has been unable to develop equivalent low-cost systems, not because it does not have the technological capability, but because the very structure of the military-industrial complex in the US, and its system of military specifications and tendering, works against it! The US system is conditioned to develop and manufacture expensive high-end world-beating military hardware, and resists adoption of “good enough” inexpensive technologies.  

The US has actually reverse-engineered the Iranian Shahed-136 armed drone such as in the FLM-136 currently costing around $35,000. Another recent US endeavour is the Merops AI-enabled interceptor drone costing around $15,000 with lower costs promised if production volumes are scaled high enough. The US has ordered 10,000 of these for supply to Israel, while Iran is said to be manufacturing equivalent numbers each month!

Asymmetric warfare

The main takeaway here is that the kind of asymmetric warfare being conducted by Iran cannot be defeated from the air alone, or merely by using the latest and most sophisticated technology. Are the US and Israel are willing to commit to boots on the ground and a “forever war” causing enormous damage to all of Iran? Even then results are far from certain. The US has learned this the hard way in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Iran is prepared for the long haul and, as in any asymmetric war, is prepared to absorb a lot of pain while itself causing considerable pain to its adversaries and their allies. Iran’s missiles and drones are Iran’s equivalent of Vietnam’s jungle warfare, and Afghanistan’s IEDs.

Way back in 2002, after the attack on the World Trade Towers, the US conducted a huge war game designed to test its most modern and technologically advanced weapons. The commander of the designated “enemy” team departed from conventional warfare, avoided all electronic communications, used manual and other similar signals, adopted hit and run tactics, and defeated the incumbent team. The Pentagon cancelled the game, and demanded new rules prohibiting the unconventional tactics! Technological superiority can provide tactical advantage, but is no assurance of a strategic victory.

Iran is prepared to dig in and use asymmetrical strategies to prolong the war and inflict as much pain as possible on its adversaries.  That itself would count as victory. The US is unlikely to be prepared for a prolonged war, especially given the regional instability and high costs deriving from the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on Gulf and other Arab States. Continued decapitation of the Iranian leadership, and extensive damage in Iran from a long bombing campaign increases the likelihood of internal chaos in Iran and accompanying uncertainties. Israel may not be bothered by this, but the US likely would. Who will prevail?