WHEN Boeing’s Starliner CST-100 spacecraft was successfully launched on June 5 earlier this year to the International Space Station (ISS), Boeing and NASA heaved a sigh of great relief. The launch was the first crewed flight test of Starliner, carrying two very experienced test-pilots and, one could say, veteran astronauts, Sunita “Suni” Williams and Barry “Butch” Wilmore. Starliner was originally scheduled to launch its first crewed mission in 2017, but a long series of glitches and problems had seen multiple postponements, so the relief in early June was palpable. But it was short-lived.

Even before launch, a leak of helium propellant was discovered but it was temporarily attended to and the launch went ahead. However, as the spacecraft entered into orbit, more helium leaks were discovered. Then, as the spacecraft approached ISS, several thrusters -- small rocket engines positioned all over the spacecraft to help manoeuvre it as required -- shut down.  Starliner managed to dock with ISS, and then a prolonged period of assessments, tests, and trial solutions commenced, stretching the mission well past its original duration. 

MISSION GOES WRONG

The two astronauts were expected to perform various activities and experiments at the ISS over eight days then return to Earth on Starliner, which was to autonomously bring the crew back to a soft landing on land rather than at sea as usual, a first for NASA. Starliner’s departure from ISS was postponed time and again because of continuing uncertainties regarding the spacecraft’s operational readiness and therefore the safety of the crew. Despite repeated tests and analyses, and trials back on earth of simulated corrective measures, the reasons for the helium leaks and the thruster malfunction could not be conclusively ascertained.

As the original ten days stretched to one month, then two and more, without any decision on when Starliner would return, anxiety grew about the well-being and future of the astronauts. Matters were not helped by media headlines and coverage proclaiming that the astronauts were “stranded in space” or “abandoned.” NASA and Boeing repeatedly declared that there was no danger to the astronauts, that there was plenty of oxygen, food, clothing and other necessities aboard ISS. Finally, on August 24, NASA announced that the spacecraft would return to earth autonomously, but without the astronauts, on September 6, a couple of days after this goes to press. Sunita Williams and Butch Wilmore, however, would return as late as January 2025. 

Starliner’s first crewed flight test, which was to herald Boeing’s return to space after many years, had been a spectacular failure. Meanwhile, its arch space rival, Elon Musk’s SpaceX, had conducted many missions to ISS and back, cementing its place as leader among US space companies. The daily screaming headlines added to Boeing’s already considerable woes, bad publicity and reputational loss, reasons for which will be discussed below. To add insult to injury, the two astronauts who had been left on ISS by Boeing’s Starliner would be brought back to earth next February on board a SpaceX Crew Dragon spacecraft. And Crew Dragon will carry only two astronauts to ISS instead of the usual four in order to make space for Sunita Williams and Butch Wilmore. Things could not have gotten worse for Boeing.

BAD OLD HABITS        

Boeing’s travails in space are not new, and are mostly of its own making.

Long used to a monopoly position in partnership with NASA, itself working till quite late on fairly languid schedules with generous budgets, Boeing enjoyed numerous years of cost-plus contracts. The scenario changed, however, with a bored American public losing interest in US crewed space flights, and even crewed landings on the moon. Crewed space programmes were then forced to shut down except for missions to ISS, and NASA got squeezed from all sides. This adversely affected legacy players like Boeing, which didn’t make necessary changes to its work practices, while opening up opportunities for new and more nimble players like Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin.

As the space shuttle programme drew to a close, NASA changed its approach fundamentally. Instead of fully NASA-owned and operated space flights, with individual elements being contracted out, NASA would henceforth act as a customer paying for launch and other services, while elements such as launchers, spacecraft etc would be fully owned and operated by individual contractors. Further, NASA replaced cost-plus contracts with fixed-price contracts in which cost overruns would be borne by the contracting companies themselves.

Effects on Boeing are visible in the Starliner programme itself.

STARLINER AND LAUNCHER

After initial development funding of Boeing’s Starliner and Crew Dragon by SpaceX, in 2014 Boeing received a fixed-price contract of 4.2 billion dollars to develop a crewed version, while SpaceX received 2.6 billion dollars. Boeing lobbied hard with NASA seeking a single-source contract, an idea that received considerable support given Boeing’s track record and long history of working with NASA, but ultimately failed. Boeing incurred substantial cost overruns to the tune of 1.5 billion dollars which it had to bear. NASA inspectors found that costs per launch were significantly higher for Boeing than for SpaceX. In end-2015, NASA dropped Boeing from its resupply service flying cargo to and from ISS.

Boeing has suffered reverses on the launch front too.

Starliner is designed for compatibility with multiple launch vehicles such as the Atlas V, on which it was launched this June, the Delta IV, Falcon 9 and Vulcan Centaur.

The Atlas V is also a legacy rocket, built by United Launch Alliance (ULA), a joint venture of Boeing and arch rival in the defence aviation sector, Lockheed Martin. Problem is the Atlas V uses Russian RD-180 engines, dating back to the days when US companies simply could not build rockets as powerful as the Russians. In the current geo-political climate, after securing several exemptions of US rules demanding cessation of collaboration or trade with Russia, ULA is finally phasing out the Atlas V. Production has ceased in 2024, with rockets for remaining contracted flights including 6 Starliner flights already produced. ULA is developing the Centaur launch vehicle, primarily for defence and intelligence purposes under defence contracts but usable for civilian purposes as well. Centaur uses Rocketdyne engines in its first stage and Blue Origin RE-4 engines for the second stage. However, it has still to receive certification for human spaceflights, which will leave Boeing in a hole as regards launch capability, with SpaceX and Blue Origin waiting in the wings.

DECLINING ENGINEERING CULTURE

These days it seems not a day passes without bad news with Boeing’s name attached to it. For years now, glaring design flaws, quality issues in manufacture and assembly, and a work culture that glosses over safety issues, cuts corners and seeks collusive relationships with regulators have plagued Boeing in space as well as in civilian passenger aviation. Long-time industry observers have criticised Boeing’s big brother attitude and a serious decline in engineering culture as resulting in all these.

The Starliner programme itself witnessed numerous snags and problems. During tests on the ground in 2018, Boeing was found to have not conducted end-to-end tests, instead conducting smaller segmented tests. After award of the NASA contract to Boeing and SpaceX, which led to a serious accident, Boeing tried to hide it from NASA. Another test bed accident in 2019 resulted in a toxic fireball, and was at least partly ascribed to a raging dispute between Boeing and engine designer and manufacturer Rocketdyne who had not been paid for design changes. In 2014, NASA had appointed 4 astronauts cum test pilots, including Sunita Williams and Bob Hurley, as consultants to test out systems in both companies’ spacecrafts and related systems. Hurley reported that while SpaceX engineers were receptive to suggestions and eager to obtain advice, Boeing engineers were “indifferent, arrogant and over-confident.” Hurley subsequently refused to fly on Starliner, and successfully flight-tested SpaceX Crew Dagon instead.

This is not an article about civil aviation, so I shall not dwell on Boeing’s multiple and highly public failures. The two Boeing 737 Max crashes killing around 350 people, break-down of flight control systems, failures of de-icing systems in 737 Max and 787 Dreamliner aircraft, doors opening and flying off mid-air due to missing bolts, the horrors don’t seem to stop. Stories of Boeing getting FAA inspectors to turn a blind eye, and the US Justice Department launching criminal investigations into Boeing’s failures and evasion of regulations are now legends of lore.

Observers have pointed out that successive Boeing CEOs have not been engineers but rather accounting persons, which is not a crime in itself, but worse have paid no heed to technological issues in its core engineering business. This must eventually impact the company finances. So far, these problems have been brushed under the carpet due to the still robust passenger aircraft business, in which Boeing is after all one out of two in the duopoly of major manufacturers, and the military aircraft business. But cracks are showing on the civilian side, with Boeing showing little interest in innovating new aircraft, driving good talent away, and also on the military side. The Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter programme is well underway and there are few signs of Boeing activity in looking beyond that. Trouble is brewing for Boeing, but nobody there is paying any attention.