Rising Threat of Automated Large Scale Election Rigging
STRANGE as it may seem, the unfolding allegations of manipulation of electoral rolls in Karnataka and Maharashtra are nothing short of that.
The episode began with the Aland constituency in Karnataka, which “received 6,018 applications in Form 7 submitted online” through various government apps in December 2022, raising suspicions. These facts were not revealed by the Election Commission (EC) suo motu. They came to light only after nearly three years, following renewed allegations this month. Even then, the EC initially dismissed the charges as “baseless” before gradually admitting specifics: through the Karnataka CEO, the EC revealed that 5,994 of these applications were found to be incorrect, while 24 deletion requests were deemed genuine. The poll body further stated that the electoral officer lodged an FIR with Kalaburagi police based on findings from initial inquiries conducted by BLOs.
The allegation suggests that the manipulations—deletions in Aland, Karnataka, and additions in Rajura, Maharashtra—were likely not the work of individuals but of a company or “call centre” running automated software. This software appears to have targeted electors listed as “serial no.1” in specific booths to initiate deletion or addition requests. The pattern strongly indicates the use of automated programmes to manipulate the rolls systematically.
In Aland, two applicants whose requests prompted deletion from the EC denied ever submitting Form 7. Clearly, these were organised attempts to tamper with the electoral rolls, executed by “someone” with explicit political interests. The fake phone numbers used for the requests were from multiple states, suggesting that the orchestrator operated remotely, using automated programmes to target specific polling booths.
In pursuit of the perpetrators, the FIR came under investigation by the Karnataka CID. On January 16, the CID wrote to the Karnataka CEO, noting: “During the course of investigation, the IP (internet protocol) logs were provided by the CEO. However, on perusal, Destination IP and Destination Port were found missing.” These details are critical for tracing the identity and location of the entity attempting to rig the electoral rolls.
While the Karnataka police received IP logs from the poll body, as of January this year, these logs lacked details of both destination IP addresses and destination ports. The state CID has maintained that only when these details are provided by the EC will it be in a position to trace the “someone” who attempted to manipulate the electoral rolls in Aland and could be the mastermind behind the fraud. That “someone” could be an individual, a company, a call centre, or even a security threat.
Despite the Karnataka CID making “18 requests in 18 months,” the EC did not comply. What were initially mere allegations have now been confirmed as facts: there was indeed an organised and centralised attempt by “someone” to tamper with electoral rolls.
The Karnataka CEO’s note confirms that of the 6,018 applications to delete electors across 10 polling booths in Aland, 5,994 were forged. The Electoral Registration Officer (ERO), alerted by BLOs about the forgery, lodged a complaint. Ultimately, only 24 applications were found genuine; the remaining requests were rejected, and an FIR was filed against the malpractice.
This situation raises multiple questions: Is the EC’s verification process for Form 7 applications –both online and offline, which relies entirely on BLOs – truly foolproof? Who is this “someone” profiting from blatant manipulation of India’s democratic process? Are companies or individuals using automated software to centralise efforts to tamper with electoral rolls? Why does the EC consistently dismiss allegations backed by prima facie credible evidence? Is this a pan-India phenomenon? As more allegations of vote manipulation surface, does the EC now need to build its own capacity to prevent such attempts? Is the EC’s role limited to merely conducting free and fair elections, or should it also involve citizens to be taken into confidence who are increasingly anxious about the lack of a level playing field in the polls?
Constituting a high-level judicial commission, an independent probe, or even a transparent investigation involving all political parties and independent experts should be the way forward. The ECI’s credibility as an independent constitutional authority has hit rock bottom. Articles 324 and 326 of the Constitution make the holding of inclusive, universal, and free elections an urgent prerequisite for safeguarding our democracy.
