Key Issues in Population and Caste Counting
B V Raghavulu
AFTER much delay and uncertainty, the Registrar General of India has finally issued a notification to conduct the national population census in 2027. A major shift in this upcoming census is the decision to include caste enumeration – something long resisted by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). While BJP spokespersons now claim the move as a step towards social justice, the context suggests that electoral considerations, rather than principled commitment, are behind this decision.
Despite the census being delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the BJP showed little interest in resuming it afterwards, possibly to ensure early delimitation process, which, by constitutional mandate, can only be carried out based on the first census post-2026. If the census is taken up before 2026, delimitation cannot be taken up. With the census now scheduled for 2027, the groundwork is set for an immediate delimitation exercise.
The Modi government has consistently resisted demands for a caste census. In 2021, the Centre told the Lok Sabha that it had adopted a policy against caste-wise enumeration. It reiterated this position in an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court. The prime minister himself, in a 2023 post-election speech, downplayed caste divisions by declaring that India has only four castes: women, youth, farmers, and the poor.
This long-standing opposition is rooted in its ideology. The Sangh Parivar has always viewed caste enumeration with suspicion, fearing it would expose the deep inequalities within Hindu society and thereby undermine the unity sought through Hindutva. The real concern is that caste data might give voice to underdeveloped communities who would then demand a more equitable distribution of resources, challenging the RSS-BJP’s communal consolidation strategy.
THE POLITICAL U-TURN
Despite this, the BJP has reversed its stance. Following its 2024 electoral losses and the visible erosion of support among OBC voters, the party has announced that caste data will be collected in the 2027 census. This volte-face appears politically driven. The BJP, while accusing the opposition parties of politicising the issue, is itself attempting to co-opt the demand in order to neutralise their influence. Even the RSS has shown signs of softening. In 2023, a prominent RSS spokesperson stated that caste data could be useful for welfare purposes, as long as it is not used for electoral gains.
The Congress also bears responsibility for the prolonged absence of caste-based data. Despite ruling the country for decades, it neither conducted a caste census nor promptly implemented the Mandal Commission’s recommendations. In 2011, it carried out the Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC), but deliberately kept it separate from the general census. Later, it withheld the caste data, citing inaccuracies. The BJP government, which came to power in 2014, subsequently shelved the SECC data altogether, despite having spent Rs 5,000 crore on the exercise.
Caste enumeration has a long and chequered history in India. While caste data was regularly collected in the censuses from 1881 to 1941, the practice was discontinued after independence. In 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel declared that caste would no longer feature in census operations. The first Backward Classes Commission led by Kaka Kalelkar in 1953, and later the Mandal Commission in 1980, both urged the government to resume caste data collection, arguing that without accurate numbers, reservation and welfare policies would be flawed. Nevertheless, successive central governments ignored these recommendations. In 2021, the National Commission for Backward Classes once again urged the government to collect caste data in the upcoming census.
In the absence of national-level caste data, several states have conducted their own caste surveys. For the first time in independent India, in 1968, EMS Namboodiripad led LDF government commissioned a Socio-Economic Survey on Castes and Communities in Kerala to collect caste details in a comprehensive and scientific manner. Bihar’s 2023 caste survey revealed that OBCs and Extremely Backward Classes constitute over 63 per cent of the state’s population. This prompted the Bihar government to increase reservation quotas for backward communities from 50 per cent to 65 per cent which was stalled by court litigation. Similarly, the Telangana government, after conducting caste survey in 2024, passed a legislation to increase Backward Class reservations to 42 per cent in education, jobs, and local bodies, and forwarded the bill for inclusion in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. Karnataka has also taken initiatives through its Socio-Economic and Educational Survey, though the report remains unpublished due to political uncertainties and concerns about data validity.
The pressure created by state-specific caste surveys and the growing demand from various quarters along with its immediate political expediency forced the BJP to bite the bullet and agree to conduct the caste count.
The 2027 census will be conducted in two phases. The first phase, starting in October 2026, will cover snowbound areas and the second phase, beginning on March 1, 2027, will cover the rest of the country. The census will comprise two components: the house listing and housing census, followed by population enumeration. For the first time, India’s census will be fully digital, incorporating mobile apps, online self-enumeration, and real-time monitoring. Caste data will be included in the population enumeration phase. The preliminary data will be released within ten days of enumeration, followed by detailed disaggregated data within six months. If this timeline is adhered to, the entire delimitation process can be completed before the 2029 elections. However, the BJP may manipulate the entire process to serve its immediate political interests.
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES
The inclusion of caste in the census will provide reliable data on numerical and socioeconomic status of different castes. This may have an impact of reinforcing the demands for increased reservations, sub-categorisation of OBCs, and the removal of the 50 per cent reservation cap. The data could also validate or refute the rationale behind the 10 per cent Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) quota. The creamy layer criteria for OBCs will be tested, and the demand for its extension to SCs may gain traction if the data reveals compelling new information. Furthermore, caste enumeration may strengthen calls for extending affirmative action to the private sector. With reliable caste data, courts will be compelled to judge such cases on merit rather than procedural grounds.
However, several challenges remain. Enumerating thousands of castes and sub-castes across regions, languages, and naming conventions is a monumental task. Without a standard classification system, the data risks being inconsistent or unusable. There may be challenges related to overcounting, undercounting, and misclassification.
Apart from reservations, the population census also affects other important political matters.
One major concern is delimitation, which has been frozen since 1976 but is scheduled to resume based on the post-2026 census. The implementation of the Women’s Reservation Bill is also contingent upon the completion of the census and the delimitation exercise.
Moreover, there is an apprehension that the census may be used to update the National Population Register (NPR), which in turn could feed into the contentious National Register of Citizens (NRC). There is widespread fear that the census process may be misused to further the divisive agenda of the ruling party. This strengthens the demand that the NPR should not be updated alongside the census.
Census data has widespread utility. If properly utilised it helps in policy planning, guides the distribution of government resources. It is essential for ministries overseeing education, health, and infrastructure. More broadly, it helps policymakers understand migration, fertility, employment, and social mobility trends.
Yet, while caste census data is useful, it is not a cure-all. Even where caste data exists – as in the case of SCs and STs – deep inequalities persist. Mere enumeration does not ensure justice. Unnecessary illusions may dilute our commitment to struggle for annihilation of caste system. Neoliberal policies, particularly under the Modi government, have eroded welfare programmes, encouraged privatisation, and cut public spending – undermining the very schemes meant to uplift the marginalised. Without challenging these structural issues, a caste census alone will not transform the lives of the poor and oppressed.
Nevertheless, caste data can be a powerful tool in the struggle for justice. It can help reveal the true nature of inequality, expose the failure of current policies, and highlight the limits of caste-based identity politics. At its best, the caste census can inform a broader movement that transcends caste and fights for structural change: universal access to quality education and healthcare, housing, land reforms, employment guarantees, and public provisioning of services.
