CHIEF of Air Staff (CoAS) Air Chief Marshall A P Singh, just last week, repeated his concerns about lack of timely deliveries of military equipment, and what he termed the “futility” of contracts without on-time delivery adversely affecting defence preparedness. CoAS was reiterating a favourite refrain over the past year, mostly targeting Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), the prime manufacturer and supplier of military aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF). His anger is mainly focused on delays in delivery of 83 Tejas Mk1A fighter jets contracted in 2021, with deliveries set to commence in March 2024. He has linked his resentment of HAL to calling for a sharp increasing the role of the private sector in defence production so as to introduce competition, and exhorted Indian suppliers to learn on-time delivery from foreign companies.

CoAS Singh’s frustration is not completely unjustified. Delayed deliveries are bad in themselves, and can be downright dangerous in defence. A few stern words in public can indeed do some good. However, he has hugely oversimplified matters. In particular, he has gravely erred in focusing on manufacturing delays at HAL and, even more so, in ascribing it to a failure to bring the Indian private sector into defence aircraft manufacturing, thereby undermining the important role played by defence public sector R&D and manufacturing industries.

Details emerging of the sterling performance of many categories of equipment and innovations made therein, in the recent four-day India-Pakistan military engagement illuminate the capabilities of defence PSUs and of course of the armed forces with whom they work closely.

MULTIPLE FACTORS

OF DELAYS  

Before coming to that, it is necessary to clear the air on the many factors that lie behind the undoubted equipment delivery delays that plague the IAF.

It is open knowledge that the IAF is heavily under-equipped in terms of fighter aircraft, with currently only 31 squadrons (roughly 18 fighters each) against the legendary sanctioned strength of 42. (This figure has been bandied about as gospel for decades even though contemporary realities call for a complete reappraisal of the structure, composition and numbers of the IAF’s fighter fleet.) With many legacy aircraft scheduled for retirement, much now depends on quick delivery of the different versions of the indigenous Tejas fighters, the Mk1, Mk1A and Mk2, designed by the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), one of the constituent labs under the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), and manufactured by HAL.

However, the IAF and India did not get to this sorry position because of HAL. India’s defence procurement procedures are a nightmare. Procurement of fighter aircraft undertaken by the defence ministry with indeterminate collaboration of the IAF, mostly with licensed production agreements with the foreign supplier, has been marked by inordinate delays, fund limitations and smaller than ideal order sizes, further leading to multiple orders resulting in a veritable menagerie of fighter aircraft.

After a long time, in 2001, MoD and the IAF embarked on a through exercise of defining planned strength and type of fighter to be ordered. 126 medium weight multi-role fighters were decided on.  Request for Information (RfI) was issued in 2001, then a Request for Proposals (RfP) or tender in 2007, then a long process of vetting, short-listing, field trials and so on. During this time, several applicants had become obsolete and the IAF’s goalposts too had shifted. Finally the Rafale was selected in 2012. One need not repeat the well-known history after that, with 126 reduced to 36, no domestic production by HAL, and deliveries from 2020-2022, a full 21 years after the procurement process started! HAL was not responsible for any of this delay!

Even today, the depleted squadron strength bequeathed by the government’s decision in 2016 to cut the requirement of 126 fighters to just 36, has compelled the floating of yet another tender for 114 fighters, for which the same contenders from the previous tender are in the fray, yet a decision is nowhere in sight! Again, the Air Chief’s frustration could perhaps be directed elsewhere other than at HAL!

FOREIGN AND INDIAN

PRIVATE SECTOR  

As for the Tejas fighters, from conception to design, the extremely long process involved the MoD, ADE/DRDO and IAF, with HAL entering the picture much later. Today, HAL is being berated by CoAS for not yet having delivered the first Tejas Mk1A by 2024 as scheduled. He knows full well that the delay is mostly due to delays in delivery of engines by the US aero-engine major General Electric, the world’s third largest aero-engine manufacturer. Should Indian PSUs learn from them?

Incidentally, HAL has set up three assembly lines to produce 8 Tejas Mk1A each, 2 in Bengaluru and 1 in Nashik, so it will deliver 24 Tejas Mk1A annually to the IAF, somewhat faster than the Rafales. It needs emphasis that in order to boost the production rate, and broaden the industrial base in advanced aviation, HAL already has in place systems for private sector manufacture of important sub-assemblies for Tejas fighters, such as fuselages or the main body by VEM Technologies, wings by L&T which has automated key procedures sharply increasing productivity, and with Tata Advanced Systems and others contributing other components. The Air Chief may rest assured that his concerns about involvement of the private sector are indeed being addressed. The growing expertise of several Indian private sector companies in aviation and advanced engineering are acknowledged, leveraged and enhanced to take them to the next level. However, the private sector needs time to grow and develop capabilities before they can become system aggregators like HAL.

INDIGENOUS DEFENCE

EQUIPMENT

The fog of war has not fully lifted over the recent India-Pakistan four-day “war.” However, the vast amount of material available in published articles and on social media – the latter unfortunately largely technically and strategically uninformed, or deliberately propagandist –can be sifted through and, based on informed analysis of reliable information, salient outcomes may be identified, pending confirmation or updating based on fresh evidence. This material, including commercial satellite imagery, accounts by the Indian military and analyses by reputed international experts in military and strategic affairs, shows that, whereas foreign-made fighter aircraft and missiles may have attracted more glamour, indigenous defence equipment had performed admirably and contributed significantly to positive outcomes for India. Some highlights may be presented.

It is now widely accepted that, between May 8-10, when India and Pakistan attacked the other’s major military bases and installations, India was able to overcome Pakistan’s foreign-acquired modern air defences and inflict serious damage on several key air bases as evidenced in commercial satellite images while, on the other hand, it managed to defend its own bases against attacks by Pak missiles, drones and drone swarms. This is a story that deserves to be told in detail and will doubtless form an important part of military history for later years.

Changes in aerial warfare, notably the advent of drones and use of air-fired medium range stand-off missiles from beyond visual range (BVR), both used extensively for the first time in a major combat situation in the India-Pakistan clash, have made it necessary to re-evaluate air defence systems and weapons. Fighter jets are really expensive these days, say $50-100 million each with a Rafale near the top of the scale, and forces are reluctant to take risks against increasingly sophisticated and effective anti-aircraft missiles, whether fired from the ground or air. As seen in the Ukraine war, both sides are extensively using armed drones of different sizes and capabilities. On the flip side, modern air-defence systems designed for use against jet fighters are armed with expensive missiles often costing $1 million each, and it hardly makes sense to use them against inexpensive drones costing, say, around $10-20,000 each.

India seems to have worked out an effective way out of this dilemma. It did not throw away its legacy anti-aircraft systems but repurposed them, upgraded them with modern radars, sensors and targeting systems, and integrated them with other indigenous as well as imported air-defence elements to form integrated multi-layered air defence systems to defend against a variety of aerial attacks. In doing so, Indian defence R&D labs and PSUs, working with the armed forces, have displayed ingenuity, clever thinking and the famous Indian ‘jugaad’ or innovative problem-solving technique.

The LR-70 anti-aircraft gun of 1960s vintage designed by Bofors and made in India under license is a case in point. It has been extensively modernised by Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL). Former manual operations have been transformed to autonomous action driven by radars and sensors, automated fire control systems, predictive firing and electrically driven operations for greater accuracy. With rapid firing of about 300 rounds per minute at target altitudes of 4km and proximate fuses, meaning they detonate near rather than only upon hitting the target, they were particularly effective against drone swarms as used by Pakistan, that is numerous drones arriving on site together designed to overwhelm radars and air-defences.  The L-70s are believed to have proved highly effective on May 8-10.

The Soviet-era Schilka Zu-23 mobile tracked-vehicle guns firing 4,000 rounds per minute at multiple targets with new radar systems capable of tracking targets upto 20km with range of 2.5km have also been similarly modernised for all-weather operation.

The air-defence package includes the indigenous DRDO Akash medium range surface-to-air (MR-SAM) missiles that can track multiple targets at 70km range with a strike range of 20km. Although having gone through multiple tests, the system underwent a trial by fire in early May and came through with flying colours, having brought down many drones and missiles. The Akash is complemented by the DRDO-Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) jointly developed Barak-8 missile system with a range of 70km and 360 degree coverage.

The crown jewel of the air defence system must however be the Akashteer AI-driven air defence system jointly developed by DRDO, BEL and ISRO which provided satellite linkage and integration. The system autonomously networks with indigenous satellites and early warning aircraft, links and controls various air defence systems, selects the appropriate system to deploy depending on the nature of the target, and is highly mobile, being operated from a lap-top sized system that can be carried in a jeep. As described by one commentator, “it sees, decides and acts.” In early May, it deployed each of the different systems discussed above, fired indigenous anti-radiation missiles at targeted Pakistani air-bases neutralising its radars and air-defence systems, and countered drone swarms. It has been widely hailed by numerous defence experts.

All the above, and there are many more, are systems developed and operationalised by defence R&D institutions and defence PSUs, with significant participation of the armed forces, and fully operationally integrated and proven under battleground conditions. This showcases the promise, potential and actual delivery of State-sector undertakings in India, when they are backed and supported by government and the armed forces. Self-reliance is the way forward. Attitudes reflecting the old-fashioned mutual rivalry between the armed forces, DRDO and defence PSUs, prejudices against PSUs or for foreign manufacturers, must be given up and all need to rally behind national goals of indigenous R&D and manufacture.