MANIK Ghonshetwad, an agricultural worker from Ambulga village in Mukhed taluka of Nanded district, Maharashtra, is seasonally employed on farmlands during specific months of the year. He works in June and July for soybean or cotton cultivation, in August and September for weeding (manually or with herbicides), and in December and January for harvesting. However, this work is sporadic, with only a few days of employment in each of these months. The limited number of working days in agriculture in his village and neighbouring areas is insufficient to meet his family’s basic needs. For the rest of the year, he takes up various forms of daily wage labour, including work as a headload worker, potter, and construction labourer – essentially any job available. Even during cultivation and harvesting seasons, he supplements his income with non-farm manual work whenever possible. He is also a regular worker under MNREGA, though his employment depends on the discretion of government and Panchayat officials. His family's livestock further contributes to their income. Maroti Shivram Mishkire, from the same village, undertakes similar agricultural and non-farm work, and also works as a driver to supplement his earnings. Additionally, he rears pigs, which provide an extra source of household income.

The two examples of multi-occupational profiles of agricultural workers encountered during the field survey in this village illustrate the changing nature of work and the rural workforce in India. They highlight how agricultural workers are confronting shrinking employment opportunities in agriculture. Multiple factors contribute to this shift, including the indiscriminate use of labour-displacing technology and the growing number of workers dependent on agriculture. We are witnessing an ever-increasing reserve army of workers who lack gainful employment in the countryside and have no assured employment in the urban centres to which they migrate. The deepening agrarian crisis in India remains the fundamental cause of this situation.

Agriculture remains one of the largest employment sectors for India’s rural population. The sector’s share in employment has steadily increased, rising from 44.1 per cent in 2017–18 to 46.1 per cent in 2023–24. According to the 2011 Census, India’s total workforce stood at 48.17 crore, of which 72 per cent belonged to rural areas, and more than half – 54.6 per cent or 26.3 crore workers – were engaged in agriculture. The agricultural workforce primarily comprises cultivators and agricultural labourers. A key distinction between these groups, as outlined by the 2011 Census, lies in land ownership: cultivators own, lease, or operate land under contract, while agricultural labourers work on land owned by others for wages in cash or kind. Furthermore, many poor farmers with small and uneconomical holdings are compelled to work as labourers on others’ farms or take up low-paid manual jobs. This has increasingly blurred the lines between farmers, tenant farmers, and agricultural workers.

Agricultural labourers form a significant segment of the rural proletariat engaged in agricultural production. They represent the most marginalised and disadvantaged class in rural India. Largely deprived of resources, most are landless, lack access to means of production, and rely solely on their labour for survival. Their socio-economic status makes them highly vulnerable to exploitation, often forcing them to accept wages set by landlords – typically below the statutory minimum. Many also lack proper housing, further deepening their precarious living conditions. In addition to economic exploitation, they face social marginalisation, including widespread discrimination and violence. Women agricultural workers, in particular, suffer from gender-based deprivation, social oppression, and are paid significantly less than men for the same work.

Systematic oppression hinders the inclusion of agricultural workers in broader development, reinforcing cycles of poverty and inequality. Historically marginalised by illiteracy, their children continue to face inadequate educational opportunities, perpetuating limited awareness and obstructing upward mobility. The lack of organisation and unionisation weakens collective bargaining and political mobilisation, resulting in limited engagement with political struggles and minimal politicisation.

Agricultural workers have historically constituted a major share of bonded labour in India, which represents one of the most extreme forms of social and economic oppression. This bondage often stems from indebtedness and is passed down through generations. It has been known by various regional names, such as Hali in Gujarat, Kamia in Bihar, Harwaha in Madhya Pradesh, Gothi in Andhra Pradesh, and Jeetha in Karnataka. Many migrant labourers in Green Revolution areas were compelled by their vulnerable circumstances to accept harsh restrictions imposed by landowners, effectively reducing them to bonded labourers. In the feudal rural structure, landless families continue to depend on landlords and wealthy farmers for their livelihood, often forced to work under exploitative conditions. Though agricultural workers may be legally freed from bonded labour, in reality, many remain tied to exploitative contracts at meagre wages in a bid to escape unemployment.

This is a rapidly growing class since Independence, with the number of agricultural workers rising significantly, especially following the implementation of neoliberal economic policies over the past three decades. From 1960 to 2001, the agricultural workforce consisted predominantly of cultivators rather than labourers. However, the 2011 Census marked a historic shift, revealing that cultivators made up less than half (around 45 per cent) of the agricultural workforce, while agricultural labourers accounted for nearly 55 per cent. In absolute terms, the number of cultivators (main and marginal) stood at 11,86,69,264, whereas agricultural labourers numbered 14,43,29,833. In 1961, there were about 33 labourers for every 100 cultivators; by 2011, this ratio had reversed to approximately 121 labourers for every 100 cultivators.

There are several reasons for the increase in the number of farm workers, but the primary cause is the pauperization of farmers, particularly after the implementation of neoliberal economic policies. With these policies, state support for agriculture has diminished, leading to a sharp rise in input costs, and there is no assurance of minimum support prices or procurement for agricultural produce. As a result, the entire agricultural production process has become increasingly uncertain. Previously, weather was the only uncertainty farmers faced, with concerns about droughts and rainfall. However, today, market uncertainties are far harsher than those posed by nature. When profit becomes the sole driving force, the livelihoods of agricultural workers are left precariously overlooked.

The ongoing agrarian crisis is displacing small and marginal farmers, forcing them to abandon agriculture as it can no longer sustain their families' livelihoods. Studies based on NSO data show that millions of small and marginal farmers are compelled to sell their land, leave cultivation, and join the ranks of manual workers. Similarly, small artisans have also lost their livelihoods and are forced to work as agricultural labourers or take up other menial jobs.

The fact that the number of agricultural workers now exceeds that of cultivators indicates a greater dependence on wage labour than on land. Despite the growing number of agricultural workers, employment opportunities in agriculture have not increased. Additionally, the indiscriminate use of labour-displacing technology has further reduced the number of working days on farms. As a result, overall unemployment in rural India has risen. The growing number of agricultural workers and decreasing agricultural work has given rise to new crises in rural areas. Unremunerative agriculture, marked by low returns from farming, remains the primary factor driving agricultural workers and small farmers to migrate in search of better livelihoods.

The steep decline and crisis in the agriculture sector have forced many young people to migrate in search of livelihoods. Under these conditions, an increasing number of workers are compelled to seek employment in non-agricultural sectors. The economic crisis and rising unemployment in cities are further complicating the situation.

This situation is forcing manual workers in rural India to take on various types of work to support their families. Most agricultural workers are not confined to a specific field of work throughout the year. Nearly all rural manual workers engage, to varying degrees, in agricultural tasks. They perform multiple jobs at different times, ranging from MNREGA work and brick kiln labour to agricultural work and industrial jobs in nearby small towns.

Hired workers in agriculture and non-agricultural tasks no longer form two distinct groups within the rural workforce. Agricultural wage workers now engage in a wide range of non-farm tasks, including migrant work in urban areas. Despite this, they retain a partial agricultural and rural identity, distinguishing them from the urban proletariat. This indicates a significant increase in the number of rural workers engaged in various sectors, yet still linked to agriculture.

The majority of agricultural and rural workers have been earning wages below the recommended minimum levels. Between 2013–14 and 2018–19, wages for major agricultural and non-agricultural occupations declined at an annual rate of 3%. Amidst low incomes and high unemployment rates, the livelihoods of agricultural workers heavily depend on welfare schemes and public sector institutions of the social welfare state. However, the very concept of such a welfare state faces opposition from both foreign and domestic capital. With the exception of Kerala’s LDF-led government, public sectors like healthcare and education are undergoing rapid privatisation. Most social welfare pensions are being shifted to targeted schemes, leaving large segments of rural India excluded. Even the right to work under MNREGA is being deliberately weakened. The crisis has reached such severity that agricultural workers are increasingly driven to suicide, reflecting the dire conditions they endure. According to the NCRB report, 40,685 farm labourers have taken their own lives since 2014.

As the work profile and living conditions of agricultural workers change, a new class of rural affluent individuals has emerged in villages, particularly over the past three and a half decades with the implementation of neoliberal economic policies. This class has benefited from these policies and is often the first to seize opportunities for higher education and modern organized sector jobs. In addition to acquiring prime agricultural land, they have also invested capital in non-farm businesses. Various studies indicate that many landlords and large capitalist farmers are involved in lucrative business activities as well.

These include moneylending, operating grain mills and dairies, trading and speculating on crops (such as food grains, horticultural, and forestry products), real estate, construction, cinema halls, petrol stations, hotels, transport services, leasing farm machinery, and running private educational institutions. Education, in particular, has become both a source of revenue and a means to consolidate social influence. These families also generate income through financial investments. Beyond economic activities, they actively seek influence in state power structures, such as local governance bodies (e.g., Panchayati Raj), state and national legislatures, law enforcement, and the legal sector.

A defining trait of this class is its political dominance in rural and semi-urban areas, exercised through alliances with bourgeois parties. Serving as a pillar of the ruling-class political machinery in villages, this group wields significant control over state institutions. It influences the implementation of rural welfare schemes – even those aimed at marginalized groups – often diverting benefits toward its own interests. This includes programs like MNREGA, which they heavily influence. Furthermore, powerful contractors, drawing on authoritarian practices tied to their feudal heritage, aggressively maximize profits through exploitative means.

Our organizational experience also shows that workers in rural India often shift between agricultural and non-agricultural roles depending on the season. Despite this fluidity, their livelihoods remain deeply rooted in agriculture, with most coming from landless labourer households. Serious efforts are needed to unite and organize workers with diverse profiles. It is crucial to organise and unite all these workers to wage a struggle against the ruling class in rural India.

Crucially, workers' struggles in rural areas go beyond workplace demands. They confront systemic issues such as landlessness, stagnant wages, exclusion from welfare schemes, and gender- and caste-based oppression. This highlights the need to unite rural workers, including migrant workers at both the source and destination of migration, as their common class identity as the rural proletariat transcends the diversity of their temporary roles. A united and organised rural proletariat can lead powerful struggles against the ruling nexus of the rural elite and Hindutva forces, paving the way for a qualitative shift in the balance of power in rural India.