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IN a decisive and unambiguous mandate, the people of Karnataka have rejected the BJP in the Assembly elections held on May 10. The election results, announced on May 13, signify the removal of the BJP from State power, thereby ending its only foothold in the entire South India. It is noteworthy that the people have delivered this verdict despite the BJP's unprecedented misuse of money and state power, extensive roadshows and rallies, grand inaugurations and announcements, divisive communal campaigns, and the intimidation and harassment of opposition candidates, supporters, and workers by the BJP and its government. Karnataka has also maintained its four-decade-long tradition of changing the ruling party in every election. Furthermore, the people have considered the potential damage that a fragmented mandate could cause to the state's polity.

The BJP's representation in the Assembly has been significantly reduced to 65 seats, experiencing a loss of 38 seats compared to its tally in 2018. This reduction is even more pronounced when considering the manufactured majority of 116 seats the BJP held after Operation Kamala and subsequent bye-elections in 2019, which then accounts to a total loss of 50 seats. In contrast, the Congress party has achieved a decisive majority with 135 seats, marking an impressive gain of 55 seats compared to the previous election (and a gain of 66 seats considering the impact of Operation Kamala). The Janata Dal (Secular) has also suffered a setback, securing its lowest ever representation with only 19 seats, losing 18 seats from its 2018 performance. Darshan Puttanaiah of Sarvodaya Party, mining baron Janardhana Reddy, and two independents have won the other four seats.

The decisive defeat of the BJP in the elections is evident from the following facts:

·         A total of 12 cabinet ministers from the BJP have suffered defeat. Notably, prominent minister Somanna who contested against Siddaramaiah, and also from another constituency, had lost in both.

·         The BJP failed to secure any seats in nine districts, including its strongholds of Kodagu and Chikkamagaluru.

·         In eight districts, the BJP managed to win only one seat.

·         Similarly, in seven districts, the BJP could secure only two seats.

·         In certain cases, rebel BJP candidates, such as in Puttur-DK (where a ‘hardcore Hindutva’ candidate contested), caused the BJP's defeat and allowed the Congress to emerge victorious, pushing the BJP to the third position.

·         The BJP experienced a loss of seats and vote percentage across all major regions, except in southern Karnataka and Bangalore city, where the gains were marginal.

·         Even in the coastal region of Karnataka, which is considered a bastion of the BJP, the party lost seats and votes, albeit on a smaller scale.

·         It is noteworthy that half of the MLAs who had defected to the BJP, leading to the collapse of the Congress-JDS government, were themselves defeated in these elections.

·         M T B Nagaraj, the richest BJP candidate, suffered defeat in the Hoskote constituency in Bengaluru rural district.

The election results are summarised in Tables 1, 2, and 3. Table 1 provides an overview of the total number of seats and vote percentages for each party at the state level. Table 2 and 3 present the regional breakdown of vote percentages and number of seats gained by each party. The tables also highlight the gains or losses compared to the 2018 election figures.

Upon examining the tables, it becomes evident that the Congress party emerged victorious in all regions. It gained both votes and seats across all regions, taking them from both the BJP and JD(S). At the state level, the Congress gained nearly 5 per cent of the votes, while the BJP experienced only a marginal decrease in vote percentage. However, the JD(S) suffered a significant loss, with its vote share decreasing by one-third.

Although the state-level figures may suggest that the Congress primarily gained votes from the JD(S), a closer look at the regional and district-level data reveals a different picture, which will be explored later.

Table 1: Karnataka Seats/Votes Percentage Tally (2023, Gain/Loss over 2018)

However, the BJP has experienced significant vote losses in most regions. Nonetheless, it has managed to compensate for these losses through gains in the southern Karnataka and Bangalore regions.

Table 2: Karnataka Region-wise Vote Percentage (2023, Gain/Loss over 2018)

Table 3: Karnataka Region-wise Number of Seats (2023, Gain/Loss over 2018)

It can be observed from Table 1, 2, and 3 that the Congress has experienced an increase in vote percentage across all regions. In terms of seats, the Congress has made gains in all regions except Bangalore city. On the other hand, the BJP has suffered losses in seats and vote percentage in all major regions, with the exception of southern Karnataka and Bangalore city, where the gains were minimal. The JD(S) has encountered significant losses in its stronghold of Southern Karnataka and has struggled to expand its presence in other regions.

WHY WAS THE BJP DEFEATED?

The reasons behind the BJP's defeat have been evident and have been discussed in these columns over the past few weeks. These reasons are further supported by detailed feedback and voter profiles obtained from various surveys conducted alongside opinion and exit polls. Moreover, the key electoral statistics also validate these findings.

The BJP governments, both at the state and central levels, faced an unprecedented and massive wave of anti-incumbency due to various factors. These include rampant corruption, exemplified by the "40% Sarkar"; the government's complete failure in effectively addressing the health and economic crises caused by Covid-19; instead of providing relief and implementing measures to curb skyrocketing prices and unemployment, existing welfare schemes were either shut down or weakened; the government's aggressive pursuit of policies that were anti-farmer, anti-worker, and anti-people; severe attacks on linguistic and cultural identity, as well as the autonomy and legitimate fiscal interests of the state. The people were fed up with the government, and this sentiment played a significant role in their decision to vote the BJP out.

In an attempt to divert attention from these failures, the BJP and the Sangh parivar engaged in a widespread campaign of religious hatred, promoting communal violence and lawlessness with the intention of creating religious polarisation. However, the people found this constant communal campaign, which disrupted peace and harmony, unacceptable, especially in the face of the BJP's gross inability to address everyday issues. The BJP's decision to fight the elections by further exploiting communal polarisation generated a significant backlash from the public. This revulsion against such tactics has also played a significant role in the party's resounding defeat.

The BJP government bringing in major changes to the reservation system in a hasty and haphazard manner, along with other attempts at "social engineering," backfired and worked against the party's interests. These changes were seen as both divide-and-rule tactics and election strategies, but they failed to yield positive results and instead created discontent among various sections of society. In particular, the introduction of "internal reservations" within the Scheduled Caste (SC) category, the scrapping of Muslim reservations and their redistribution among the Lingayat/Vokkaliga communities ended up upsetting more people rather than appeasing or satisfying them. Surveys have confirmed this negative sentiment.

While many analysts attribute the removal of Yediyurappa and the "wounding of Lingayat pride" as the primary reasons for the BJP's electoral defeat, the ground reality is more complex. The rampant factionalism within the state BJP, coupled with the central "High Command" not allowing the emergence of strong local leadership and the constant efforts of the RSS to exert control over the party and the government, are the root causes of the situation. These are inherent features of the RSS-BJP combine and have contributed to misgovernance, the lack of performance by the government, and organisational problems within the party. This, in turn, resulted in chaos during the distribution of seats and further complicated the electoral landscape.

The BL Santosh faction, often referred to as the RSS-Brahmin faction, aimed to diminish the influence of the dominant Lingayat faction within the BJP. They attempted to achieve this through a seat distribution strategy inspired by the "Gujarat Model." This approach was implemented with the full knowledge and approval of the party's high command. Objectively speaking, the BJP needed to move away from over-reliance on one single (aging) leader or community in order to broaden its support base. However, when considering the other significant factors mentioned earlier, as well as the personal ambitions of faction leaders, this strategy resulted in generating anger within the Lingayat community.

The significant loss of seats and vote share in the Kittur+Central region, which encompasses constituencies dominated by the Lingayat community, as indicated in Table 2 and 3, further highlights the impact of this factor on the BJP's electoral performance. Several surveys have also directly confirmed the role of Lingayat anger in the party's defeat. However, this represents a political strategy that led the BJP into a dead-end rather than an avoidable "accident."

The implementation of the 'Gujarat Model' in seat distribution, which involved denying tickets to sitting MLAs and introducing 'fresh faces,' proved to be a resounding failure in practice. While one-third of the sitting MLAs managed to secure victory, only one-fifth of the 'fresh faces' were successful in their electoral fight.

The BJP displayed overconfidence in the influence of the so-called 'Modi magic' during the last two weeks of the elections, disregarding the prevailing anti-incumbency sentiment. Prime Minister Modi participated in 18 rallies, five roadshows, and numerous official inaugurations/announcements. However, upon analysing the constituencies he covered, it became evident that these efforts have yielded no results, with the exception of some impact in Bengaluru city. This observation holds true for Amit Shah as well. The Modi-Shah campaign slogan of 'Double Engine' failed to resonate, even among Modi supporters who felt  that one of the engines is weak or rusted. Modi's emphasis on fighting corruption and criticising the Congress' 'Parivar-vaad' (dynastic politics) also appeared hollow to many. Additionally, Shah's announcement of the 'Nandini-Amul merger' was cleverly exploited by the Congress, and it became a symbol of an attack on Kannada pride and regional autonomy, working against the BJP.

Despite the aforementioned factors, the BJP could have still managed to avert such a significant defeat and potentially form a government. The BJP had done this in many states. However, in this instance, the BJP failed to anticipate the presence of a well-organised, motivated, and aggressive opposition in the form of the Congress party. The BJP did not adequately account for the opposition's strength and strategy. Additionally, the ambivalence and weaknesses of the JD(S) further compounded the challenges faced by the BJP, contributing to their electoral setback.

 WHAT WORKED FOR THE CONGRESS?

The Congress party executed its strategy and tactics with meticulous planning. Its campaign strategy steered clear of personal attacks on Prime Minister Modi or Home Minister Shah, as well as avoiding getting drawn into emotional or personal issues as bait set by the BJP and PM Modi. The party focused on its welfare agenda, initially highlighting four key 'Guarantees' and later expanding to a fifth. It conducted a robust campaign addressing issues that directly affected the people, such as corruption, price rise, unemployment, and food insecurity. The party opposed various anti-farmer, anti-worker, and anti-people policies and laws introduced by the BJP government in the assembly. The Congress also took steps to address its organisational problems, ensuring that they did not become obstacles to its campaign. Furthermore, the party emphasised the importance of local leadership without specifically naming a chief ministerial candidate. It capitalised on every opportunity to hold the BJP government accountable when it faltered, such as in the cases of the reservation policy and the Nandini-Amul merger. While the Congress refrained from frontal attacks on the JD(S) during most of the campaign, it urged the people to give it a full majority to avoid an unstable and corrupt government.

The Bharat Jodo Yatra helped in broadening the Congress party's appeal and gaining support from civil society. The party adopted a judicious approach, combining mass contact initiatives with large meetings and rallies to connect with the masses. Throughout the campaign, the Congress focused on its 'Guarantees,' particularly targeting women and youth. It consistently emphasised communal harmony and called out the BJP for its divisive tactics whenever necessary. For instance, it vehemently criticised the scrapping of Muslim reservations and robustly defended the rights of marginalised communities. The party's manifesto was well-balanced, effectively addressing the concerns of various sections of society. Even when the BJP attempted to exploit certain aspects of the Congress manifesto, such as the mention of the PFI and Bajrang Dal, the Congress remained unfazed and successfully weathered the attacks. Although the Congress faced challenges during the seat allocation process due to internal factionalism, it managed to limit the damages to a minimum.

 The Congress party's focus on the five 'Guarantees' of welfare measures in its campaign resonated strongly with the public, especially considering the acute distress caused by neoliberal policies, the significant anti-incumbency sentiment against the BJP government, and the internal chaos within the BJP party. As can be seen in the figures in Table 2 and 3, the Congress received support across all regions. Numerous surveys have indicated that the party successfully built and consolidated a social coalition comprising SC, ST, Muslim, and OBC sections. It also garnered increased support from the Lingayat and Vokkaliga communities. However, these surveys have highlighted that the former consolidation played a more significant role in the party's success, spanning across all regions. While 'Lingayat anger' against the BJP was a factor, it was not the sole or even the major factor contributing to the Congress' victory. The surveys have also revealed that the Congress' 'Guarantees' garnered disproportionately higher support from women, youth, and the more marginalised sections of society across economic and social hierarchies. In contrast, the BJP found more support among the middle and higher sections of these hierarchies. Moreover, the Congress experienced a 6.2 per cent increase in votes in rural areas, while the BJP's vote share decreased by 3.6 per cent.

WHY THE JD(S) IS DECLINING ?

The JD(S) confused its voters by sending mixed messages, simultaneously stating that it opposes both the national parties while also claiming that both the parties were contacting them. The party failed to dispel the perception that it was a party of one family, one community, and one region. Internal disputes within the family regarding seat distribution further damaged its reputation. Moreover, the party's strategy of offering tickets to those who were denied by the Congress and BJP did not improve its image. Due to the poor health of senior leader Devegowda and with lone H D Kumaraswamy as a star campaigner, the JD(S) could not conduct an extensive campaign. The party's selection of candidates was also questionable, depriving it of credibility. Additionally, the JD(S)'s earlier opportunistic alliance with the BJP, despite professing secularism, did not align well with the prevailing anti-incumbency sentiment against the BJP. While the party's assurances and manifesto were promising, they lacked credibility and failed to effectively reach the masses.

As evident from Tables 1, 2, and 3, the JD(S) has witnessed a significant decline not only in its strong base but also in other regions. Despite being a party with a rural base, its vote share in rural and semi-rural areas has declined by 3.7 and 5.4 percentage points, respectively. The JD(S) attempted to expand its support among the Muslim community, but was not successful despite choosing C M Ibrahim as its president. The party's frequent associations with the BJP would not have inspired confidence among Muslim voters either.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF KARNATAKA VERDICT?

The historic verdict holds valuable lessons for the Congress party, not only for upcoming elections in other states such as Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh but also for the crucial Lok Sabha elections next year. The Congress must pay heed to these lessons and ensure the utmost sincerity and diligence in implementing its guarantees and fulfilling the promises outlined in its manifesto. The successful implementation of these commitments will have implications not only for elections in other states scheduled for this year but also for the broader Lok Sabha elections next year.

While the BJP may have faced a significant defeat, it is essential to acknowledge that its social base and organisational strength have remained intact. The party's strongholds in coastal districts such as Udupi and Dakshina Kannada remain unwavering, which may see even stronger Hindutva agenda. The BJP can replicate its lab model in other districts of the state, and it may do so more vigorously than ever before. Therefore, it is crucial for Left, democratic, and secular forces to confront them on the ground with a robust network leading the campaign. The Congress also needs to lend its support by tackling communal organisations, de-communalising the administration, and ensuring state institutions are free from any communal influence.

It is indeed true that the decline of the JD(S) can be attributed to its own shortcomings. The analysis reveals an increase in the percentage of direct contests compared to 2018. This trend poses a risk of Karnataka becoming a "binary state," which is not a healthy development for Left and democratic forces seeking to foster alternative politics based on alternative policies. These elections have further reduced the political space for Left and democratic forces, with the exception of a Sarvodaya representative who won with Congress support. It is likely that the Congress may continue to pursue anti-people, neoliberal policies or may not earnestly implement its own manifesto. In such circumstances, it becomes imperative for Left and democratic forces to remain vigilant and exert pressure on the Congress government to prioritise pro-people measures and policies.

In light of its recent success, the Congress party is more likely to contest the Lok Sabha elections independently. However, it needs to be mindful of the prevailing political trend in Karnataka where voters often choose different parties at the state and central levels. Considering the paramount importance of fielding a united candidate against the fascistic BJP in the 2024 elections, the Congress party bears the responsibility to engage in a political dialogue with the JD(S) as well as with Left and democratic forces. If the Congress fails to initiate this dialogue, it becomes imperative for left and democratic forces to exert pressure on the Congress to commence the process.

CPI(M)’s Performance

Withdraw Anti-Farmer, Anti-Labour Amendment Acts and the NEP during Swearing-in Itself

CPI(M) Karnataka state committee has issued the following statement on May 13, 2023

THE CPI(M) Karnataka state committee congratulates the electorate of the state for resolutely defeating the communal and anti-people BJP in the Assembly elections, in response to the call made by the CPI(M) and other Left and secular democratic forces.

The CPI(M) would like to sincerely express its gratitude to the voters for their valuable votes and unwavering support to the Party candidates in Bagepally and other constituencies, despite the intense anti-democratic influence of money-power and caste-communal politics.

The CPI(M) supports the pro-people policies of the new government. Likewise, the CPI(M), together with the Left and secular democratic forces, will oppose any attempts to implement anti-people policies of globalisation. They will work for pro-people policies and will strive for harmony in the state.

The CPI(M) demands that the incoming new government withdraws the three anti-farmer and pro-corporate agriculture laws, namely the Land Reforms Amendment Act-2020, APMC Amendment Act-2020, and Cattle Slaughter Prohibition Amendment-2020. The government should also repeal the anti-labour Explosive Factories Amendment Act-2023. Furthermore, the implementation of the New Education Policy should be halted and this policy should be withdrawn. These actions should be taken by the government immediately after its swearing-in.

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