CALLING for a review of all saffron terror cases, Indresh Kumar, an important RSS leader who was interrogated for his suspected involvement in the Mecca Masjid blast case, told The Indian Express on May 24, 2014 that “The election results have come as second freedom; this freedom we have got from our own people. Digvijaya Singh and Manish Tewari (Congress leaders --- Ed) must realise that they do not have any right to spoil anybody’s life. These leaders and these agencies must apologise publicly.” The statement reveals the stake that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its functionaries had in the Lok Sabha elections of 2014. Such an expectation of RSS functionaries from the new Modi government is also not unreal because of the foundational role played by the RSS (often called the Sangh) in the latest success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). THE RSS & THE BJP The latest Lok Sabha elections clearly show that the RSS has transformed itself into a politically ambitious rather than merely a ‘cultural nationalist’ organisation. For an organisation that is known for showing scant respect for liberal democratic values, the RSS has provided the bulwark for the micro-management of the BJP campaign in close to 225 seats in the Hindi belt. It is significant that the BJP won 201 seats from this belt. It is becoming apparent that Modi would have been unsuccessful in selling his model of corporate Hindutva if the RSS had not provided the social and political infrastructure in this belt. RSS cadres have effected a process of social engineering that has been crucial to the success of Modi and which, it hopes, will provide the required social stability for the long term success of the Sangh’s ‘Hindu’ nationalism. In the Sangh’s own perception, it seems that the long term presence of the RSS cadre is necessary in order to keep the BJP on the ‘right’ ideological track. It should be clear that it is not going to withdraw its cadres from the BJP in the post-election scenario. As is evident from media reports, the organisation plans to induct 2000 RSS cadres at various levels of the BJP in the next two to three years. It hopes that within five years these cadres will rise up in the party hierarchy to ensure that Modi’s personal and political ambition does not hijack the BJP. As Manmohan Vaidya is reported to have said, this influx of the RSS into the BJP will be a ‘natural process’ and therefore, there will be no need to remote control the government. It is significant that three most important functionaries of the BJP in Uttar Pradesh (in Varanasi, Lucknow and Raebareli) who coordinated the UP campaign with Amit Shah were important RSS functionaries. Similar postings have also been made in other states. What is interesting to note is that the same process was carried out by Balasaheb Deoras in 1988-89 when he sent Govindacharya, Seshadari Chari and Narendra Modi into the BJP to strengthen it and take it over. Modi is obviously aware of this experience and is therefore carrying out hectic parleys with the RSS to ensure his personal control over the organisation. The transformation of the RSS from a so called ‘cultural’ organisation with covert political intent into a politically ambitious, overtly active organisation in these elections is influenced by its post-2002 Gujarat experience. Through his reinvention of Hindutva in a depoliticised model of development, Modi has created a larger than life cult around himself that has some times ended up sacrificing the cadre of the RSS. This is particularly seen in the Naroda Patiya case where Modi virtually refused to bail out VHP and Bajrang Dal functionaries, Babu Bajrangi and Maya Kodnani. In fact when the state government appealed for an enhancement of punishment in the case, many in the RSS felt that Narendra Modi was sacrificing its cadres for its political ambitions. But it needs to be emphasised that this argument about the apparent contradiction between the appeal of Modi and the organisational control over the RSS cannot be stretched beyond a point. Hindu nationalism not only runs in the DNA of Modi; he is also perceived to be its most successful icon. The RSS hopes that his one weakness, i.e., his megalomania and promotion of his own self-image, can be offset by the ideological purity and organisational acumen that its cadre will provide to the BJP. ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION FOR POLITICAL SUCCESS In order to come out as an active political player, the RSS has had to transform its own method of functioning. The first step taken by its supreme, Mohan Bhagwat, was a modernisation of the Sangh where his main priority was to attract the youth. In 2012 the RSS took out a directive that no person above the age of 75 would be given organisational responsibilities. Further, the RSS took to widening its reach by opening up membership outside the shakhas. Hence a youth can now join the RSS on the web by simply clicking “join RSS.” Since March 2013, about 30,000 youth are said to have joined the RSS. The Sangh has started organising information technology milans (meets) to attract the youth from professional backgrounds. These youth provided an important technical army to man the daily feedback system that the RSS provided to the BJP organisers. The core team formed for the elections did a survey of 450 out of 542 constituencies and allocated 10 youth per booth to provide phone based data feedback to ensure a high turnout. Similar teams were made of women through affiliate organisations which approached every household. They echoed the sarsanghchalak’s opinion and spread the message “don’t listen to your husband, just vote for the BJP.” Such women and youth brigades have teamed up with senior RSS functionaries in UP, Rajasthan, MP and other states who provided ideological materials, coordinated the main local campaign and attempted to ensure that the “Hindu flock” remained intact. Such precision functioning was crucial for affecting the local level polarisation that was seen in the Hindi speaking states. However, this transformation of the RSS workforce is not the only reason for its successful micro-management of elections. Another aspect that needs more attention is the way in which the RSS has penetrated the caste organisations of Northern India. A study of Lucknow and Ahemdabad by Aseem Prakash of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences reveals the changing role and structure of caste collectives in the present day. According to him, caste collectives are generally started by a politically active person or some senior person with influence in the government. The members of these caste collectives comprise educated people with a “modern outlook” and social activists. Business people and traders who control important sectors like real estate, transport, liquor trade, construction and security agencies also form an important part of these associations. The study shows that most of these associations have overlapping membership with the Sangh affiliates and with state trader associations. His field analysis reveals that a majority of the trader and caste associations were aligned with the BJP. In this situation, the work of the RSS volunteers is to coordinate with these agencies and organise meetings with them, mobilise funds and organise meetings between the candidates and local business groups who provide backup support to the political campaign. MAJORITARIANISM & ‘DEPOLITICISATION’ OF DEVELOPMENT The layers of Modi’s corporate Hindutva are not merely driven by the top down media heavy campaign but also engineered from below by the RSS through a well planned strategy and organisational bulwark. In this strategy the RSS is crafting a majoritarian vision of both democracy and development through the ideological instrument of ‘depoliticisation’ of the development discourse. It believes that the Gujarat model is the best mascot of this discourse and Modi its iconic carrier. It was thus that Mohan Bhagwat aptly stated: “our job is not to chant NaMo, NaMo but to raise national issues.” The definition and parameters of these “national issues” encompasses the core Hindutva agenda of the promotion of national unity and public service (to be read as abrogation of article 370, implementation of a majoritarian uniform civil code, and of course the Ram Mandir as an icon of national service). The Modi mascot has continuously represented this where the age old capitalist moral values of “discipline, service and sacrifice” are projected as the core principles of governance. Modi’s life and work are projected in this very light and they form the core marketing strategy of the Sangh’s ideological strategy. The evidence presented above throws light on the new challenges that a transformed RSS has thrown to the whole social ethos of this country. First, there is the ideological challenge of a new imagination of majoritarianism and modern development. Such a vision is a direct product of the political, social and cultural vacuum created by the crisis of the welfare state. The slogan of “limited government, maximum governance” creates the social space for weakening the forces of social reform and reinventing traditional institutions to extend their hold over democratic processes. The Sangh has been quick to adapt itself to this reality. Second, the social alliances created through systematic penetration have strengthened the grassroots hold of the Sangh. In a sense the projection of the Sangh as an ‘inclusive’ organisation has aided the process of preparing the foundation for Modi’s victory. Again, the Sangh has broken its archaic Brahminical structures to incorporate new social strata and castes in a way that has, at least temporarily, erased the memories of the Babri Masjid and the Gujarat riots. An inherently anti-democratic organisation has made use of the democratic processes to expand its influence. All those people who cherish the democratic and secular values of our society and who desire a strengthening of the foundations of our republic will have to properly and adequately understand these strategies in order to build innovative strategies to combat the RSS, both ideologically and on the ground.